

Fleet Management Considering Inspection Schedule Optimization



Juan Ocampo, Nathan Crosby, Harry Millwater,
Chris Hurst, Beth Gamble, and Marv Nuss




August 29, 2022


Outline




- ✓ Probabilistic Damage Tolerance Analysis Review
- ✓ Inspections Schedule Optimization
 - ✓ Shortest Path Algorithm
 - ✓ Path trimming
- ✓ Fleet Management
- ✓ Example Problem
 - ✓ Wing Spar
- ✓ Conclusions



SMART|DT



Motivation




Ref: USAF AFRL-RX-WP-TR-2008-4373, Recommended Processes and Best Practices for NDI of Safety-of-Flight Structures

Motivation



Traditional methods do not:

- account for variation in usage, material, and geometry.
- Have into account past and future usage
- include cost of inspection and repair.




Motivation



Traditional methods:

- Typically set Repeat intervals from detectable to critical divided by 2 or 3
- Assumes 90% POD for a detectable crack size
- Provides two chances to find a crack of detectable size




Ref: USAF AFRL-RX-WP-TR-2008-4373, Recommended Processes and Best Practices for NDI of Safety-of-Flight Structures

Motivation



Traditional methods:

- Typically set Repeat intervals from detectable to critical divided by 2 or 3
- Assumes 90% POD for a detectable crack size
- Provides two chances to find a crack of detectable size




Motivation



Traditional methods:

- Typically set Repeat intervals from detectable to critical divided by 2 or 3
- Assumes 90% POD for a detectable crack size
- Provides two chances to find a crack of detectable size




Motivation



Traditional methods:

- Typically set Repeat intervals from detectable to critical divided by 2 or 3
- Assumes 90% POD for a detectable crack size
- Provides two chances to find a crack of detectable size



Inspections Schedule Optimization



Shortest path formulation



The decision tree $G(V,A)$ is described by the set of vertices V and its corresponding set of arcs A .

$C = \{c_{ij} / c_{ij} \text{ is the cost of traversing the link between } i \text{ and } j\}$

$X = \{x_{ij} / x_{ij} \text{ is } 1 \text{ for the decision of travel through the link } (i,j) \text{ and } 0 \text{ otherwise}\}$

$V = \{\text{Set of vertices of the graph}\}$

$A = \{\text{Set of arcs of the graph}\}$

Minimize

$$\sum_{(i,j) \in A} C_{ij} X_{ij}$$

subject to


If $F_k > \text{threshold}$

then $X_{kj} = 0, \forall j$


$$C_{ij} = M$$

$$X_{ij} \leq F_i, \forall j$$


$$x_{ij} \in \{0,1\}$$



Shortest Path - Single Inspection



User defined inspections at: 5k, 10k, 15k, 20k, and 25k






Visualization example

User defined candidate inspection times

Threshold: 10^{-7}

POFs for each branch / inspection schedule
32 SMART Runs


Shortest Path - Single Inspection



Selected branch
(1,2,5,11,23,47)



Selected schedule [10000,15000,20000,25000]

User defined inspections at: 5k, 10k, 15k, 20k, and 25k




Possible inspection times [5000:5000:25000]

Shortest Path - Single Inspection




User defined inspections at: 10k, 15k, 20k, and 25k



Selected branch
(1,3,10,31)

Selected schedule [10000,15000,25000]
Selected inspection type [2,2,2]



Possible inspection times [10000,15000,20000,25000]

Inspection and repair costs
can be variable thru time

\$\$ Inspection 1	[\$0.3	\$0.3	\$0.3	\$0.3]
\$\$ Inspection 2	[\$0.8	\$0.8	\$0.8	\$0.8]

Shortest path with branch skipping algorithm





Branches skipping algorithm






All branches evaluated
512
Without skipping algorithm

Skipping algorithm
filters up all possible
scenarios

Necessary branches to evaluate
76
With skipping algorithm


Threshold: 10^{-7}





Inspection Combination Matrix

One Inspection Type



Possible inspection times [3000:3000:27000]

Schedule times (10^3 flight hours)

	3	6	9	12	15	18	21	24	27
	2^8	2^7	2^6	2^5	2^4	2^3	2^2	2^1	2^0
(1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
(2)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
(3)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
(4)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
(5)	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
(i)	Binary(i - 1)								
:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
(512)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1


Number of possible inspections times: number of positions that will be fill with all the numerical combinations in base 2

One inspection type → "Inspection or no inspection" → Base 2 numbers



Inspection Combination matrix

Two Inspection Types



Possible inspection times [3000:3000:27000]

Schedule times (10^3 flight hours)


	3	6	9	12	15	18	21	24	27
	3^8	3^7	3^6	3^5	3^4	3^3	3^2	3^1	3^0
(1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
(2)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
(3)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
(4)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
(5)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
(6)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
(7)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
(143)	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	2	1
(i)	Base3(i - 1)								
(19 683)	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

Number of possible inspections times: number of positions that will be fill with all the numerical combinations in base 3

Two inspection types \rightarrow "Insp. type 1, insp. type 2 or no insp." \rightarrow **Base 3** numbers




Reject and Skip Branches Evaluation One Inspection Type




Possible inspection times [3000:3000:27000]

The code evaluates each new combination until get a **feasible solution**, which will be saved






Reject and Skip Branches Two Inspections Type




Possible inspection times [3000:3000:27000]





Feasible Branches Evaluation Two Inspection Type



Schedule times (10^3 flight hours)

	3	6	9	12	15	18	21	24	27
(1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
(505)	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0
(506)	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	1
(507)	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	2
(508)	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	1	0
(509)	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	1	1
(510)	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	1	2
(511)	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	2	0
(512)	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	2	1
(513)	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	2	2
(514)	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	0

Possible inspection times [3000:3000:27000]


Schedule combinations

Method will skip POF evaluations from 505 to 514

Risk Management




Analogy to Human Mortality



US Mortality, 2019
Source: Social Security Administration


Analogy to Human Mortality





Interpretation:

- Consider an individual alive at time t
- The chances of dying in a small interval $[t, t+dt]$ are then given by: $HZ(t) \cong hz(t) * dt$

Analogy to Human Mortality



How to use in Fleet Management




Interpretation:


- Consider an individual aircraft found not cracked at time t
- The chances of having a fatigue crack in a small interval $[t, t+dt]$ are then given by: $SFPOF(t) \cong sfpof(t) \cdot dt$

Example

General Aviation Corporate Jet With Wing
Forward Spar Cap Cracking




Input Data – Fracture Mechanics




Input Data – Fracture Mechanics



Simplified Geometry



Idealized Geometry



$$\frac{\sigma_{bearing}}{\sigma_{bypass}} = .66$$

Input Data – Fracture Mechanics



<u>Random Variable</u>	<u>Distribution</u>	<u>Parameters</u>
Paris m	Binormal	Mean = 2.586 Standard Deviation = 0.0
Paris c (log)	Binormal	Mean = -7.888 Standard Deviation = 0.04
Correlation	-	0
Walker Exponent	-	0.82
Ultimate Stress	Normal	Mean = 69.0 ksi Standard Deviation = 0.0 ksi
Yield Stress	Normal	Mean = 58.0 ksi Standard Deviation = 0.0 ksi
Hole Offset	Normal	Mean = 0.9000 in Standard Deviation = 0.0 in

Input Data – Fracture Mechanics



! Afgrow Model 1030 / 2030 - 0.6619 Bearing Load transfer

! Width = 2.30 in

! Thk = 0.175 in

! H Dia = 0.164 in

! H Ofc = 0.90 in

!

c	beta
0.0050	3.59907
0.0100	3.20130
0.0150	2.89657
⋮	⋮
0.8100	3.86109
0.8150	6.21646
0.8200	27.93956

Thru crack
Betas


!

!beta c Crack Direction	0.0050	0.0125	0.0200	0.0275	0.0350	...	0.1475	0.1550	0.1625	0.1700	0.1750
0.0050	2.24485	3.19804	3.48930	3.62330	3.70123	...	3.99493	4.00368	4.01206	4.02010	4.02529
0.0125	1.00838	1.97282	2.45652	2.72711	2.89341	...	3.40218	3.41236	3.42193	3.43095	3.43671
0.0200	0.65282	1.21655	1.77304	2.07547	2.28183	...	2.97105	2.98348	2.99503	3.00581	3.01263
⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	...	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮
0.8000	0.02662	0.04209	0.05456	0.06696	0.08040	...	0.77079	0.90930	1.09491	1.36974	1.65756
0.8075	0.02630	0.04161	0.05398	0.06629	0.07965	...	0.80831	0.97114	1.20536	1.60190	2.12351
0.8150	0.02620	0.04147	0.05383	0.06615	0.07955	...	0.86325	1.06395	1.38532	2.08510	3.90826
0.8180	0.02616	0.04141	0.05377	0.06610	0.07952	...	0.88947	1.11091	1.48752	2.47098	2.17E+07


!

!beta a Crack Direction	0.0050	0.0125	0.0200	0.0275	0.0350	...	0.1475	0.1550	0.1625	0.1700	0.1750
0.0050	2.38094	1.40933	1.01682	0.81909	0.70182	...	0.32664	0.31896	0.31184	0.30520	0.30101
0.0125	2.85559	2.26857	1.78653	1.46485	1.24436	...	0.49365	0.48046	0.46834	0.45714	0.45014
0.0200	3.07986	2.35492	2.15685	1.84767	1.60820	...	0.61072	0.59219	0.57526	0.55972	0.55005
⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	...	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮
0.8075	1.15054	1.14212	1.15544	1.18763	1.23595	...	3.66367	4.14637	4.85539	6.09787	7.79295
0.8150	1.14916	1.14142	1.15570	1.18912	1.23898	...	3.94530	4.58217	5.63174	8.01747	14.50856
0.8180	1.14861	1.14116	1.15584	1.18977	1.24025	...	4.07878	4.80130	6.07016	9.54257	8.14E+07


Part-thru crack
Betas



c-direction (along surface) betas




a-direction (through thickness) betas



Loading Parameters



Pressurized usage



Parameter	Value
Design Load Limit Factors	Man (-1.50 3.60) Gust (-3.00 5.00)
Ground Stress	-100 psi
One-g Stress	3800 psi
Average Velocity	300 knots

Segment	Weight	KEAS	% Duration
CLIMB	14511	246	0.19
CRUISE	13709	221	0.55
DESCENT	13100	300	0.14
HOLD	12932	250	0.06
APPROACH	12803	150	0.06

Sort matrix in ascending order for speed & weight

$V_C = 300$ KEAS


MTOW = 17200 lb

Average Speed During Flight, % Max Takeoff Weight

Flight Time (hrs)	% of Flights	0.500	0.826	0.833	0.957	1.00
0.62	1.0	0.14	0.19	0.13	0.38	0.16

Average Speed During Flight, % Design Velocity

Flight Time (hrs)	% of Flights	0.803	0.810	0.816	0.834	0.855
0.62	1.0	0.14	0.13	0.16	0.38	0.19



Input Data – Fracture Mechanics



Variable	Dist. Type	Mean	St. Dev.	Notes
Initial Crack Size	Lognormal	0.00248 in	0.00129	Reamed Fastener Hole
Repair Crack Size	Lognormal	0.00248 in	0.00129	Assuming Repair is Replacement of Part
Fracture Toughness	Normal	26.0 ksi	2.0	7050-T651 Plate
EVD	Gumbel	14.5 ksi	0.8	

Inspection Data



Inspections	Inspection Type	Material	Crack Type	Dist. Type	Mean [in]	St. Dev. [in]	Source	Cost
⚡ POD 1	Automated bolt hole eddy current	Aluminum	T	Lognormal	0.0180	0.0109	Aeronautical Applications of Non-destructive	50x
⚡ POD 2	Eddy current sliding probe	Aluminum	Overall	Lognormal	0.0788 +0.0625	0.0302	NDE Capabilities Book	10x
👁️ POD 3	Visual	Aluminum		Lognormal	0.99714 +0.0625	3.66907	NDE Capabilities Book	1x



Risk
10^{-7}

Possible inspection times									
2,000	4,000	6,000	8,000	10,000	12,000	14,000	16,000	18,000	20,000
👁️	👁️	👁️ ⚡⚡	👁️	👁️	👁️ ⚡⚡	👁️	👁️	👁️ ⚡⚡	👁️ ⚡⚡

Results



Possible inspection times = [2000, 4000, 6000, 8000, 10000, 12000, 14000, 16000, 18000, 20000]



Operations = 1,048,576
SMART-DT runs= 1,287

Fleet Management



Airplane number	Time in service
1	1,053
2	5,350
3	3,947
4	3,850
5	7,500
6	12,300
7	17,683
8	6,356
9	8,540
10	7,640

SMART|DT Untitled.smdt
— □ ×

File Help

SMART|DT

i Information
⚙️ Analysis
🏠 Material
📐 Geometry
📈 Loading
🔍 Inspections
▶️ Run
📊 Results

Results

i Probability of Failure

Fleet Management

Load External POF
 POF Cumulative

Probability of Failure (POF) vs. Flights

Flights
 Hours

— POF (w/o Insp.) HndbkInspOpt_pof.csv — POF (w/ Insp.) HndbkInspOpt_pof.csv

Vertical Grid
 Horizontal Grid

Current Time in Service	No. Aircraft	Expected Future Hours (dt)	H _z (t)'dt	H _z (t)
1,053	1			
5,350	1			
3,947	1			
3,850	1			

Load
Save
Compute

Total Hazard:


Add
Delete

Fleet Management



- Scenario 1 – without inspections

Airplane number	Time in service	Hazard Rate	Probability of Failure For Expected Future Hours		
			100	500	1,000
1	1,053	2.32E-15	3.10E-13	3.10E-12	1.02E-11
2	5,350	1.84E-11	2.00E-09	1.31E-08	4.04E-08
3	3,947	1.14E-12	1.24E-10	1.21E-09	3.98E-09
4	3,850	1.04E-12	1.09E-10	9.64E-10	3.43E-09
5	7,500	4.24E-10	4.49E-08	2.74E-07	8.25E-07
6	12,300	3.79E-07	4.18E-05	2.87E-04	9.94E-04
7	17,683	7.88E-03	8.29E-01	5.29E+00	1.67E+01
8	6,356	8.66E-11	9.33E-09	6.01E-08	1.77E-07
9	8,540	1.60E-09	1.68E-07	1.01E-06	3.05E-06
10	7,640	4.94E-10	5.19E-08	3.21E-07	9.91E-07
Total Hazard			8.29E-01	5.29E+00	1.67E+01




Fleet Management



- Scenario 1 – without inspections

Airplane number	Time in service	Hazard Rate	Probability of Failure For Expected Future Hours		
			100	500	1,000
1	1,053	2.32E-15	3.10E-13	3.10E-12	1.02E-11
2	5,350	1.84E-11	2.00E-09	1.31E-08	4.04E-08
3	3,947	1.14E-12	1.24E-10	1.21E-09	3.98E-09
4	3,850	1.04E-12	1.09E-10	9.64E-10	3.43E-09
5	7,500	4.24E-10	4.49E-08	2.74E-07	8.25E-07
6	12,300	3.79E-07	4.18E-05	2.87E-04	9.94E-04
7	17,683	7.88E-03	8.29E-01	5.29E+00	1.67E+01
8	6,356	8.66E-11	9.33E-09	6.01E-08	1.77E-07
9	8,540	1.60E-09	1.68E-07	1.01E-06	3.05E-06
10	7,640	4.94E-10	5.19E-08	3.21E-07	9.91E-07
Total Hazard			8.29E-01	5.29E+00	1.67E+01




Fleet Management



- Scenario 2 - With inspections

Airplane number	Time in service	Hazard Rate	Probability of Failure For Expected Future Hours		
			100	500	1,000
1	1,053	1.67E-15	3.10E-13	3.10E-12	1.02E-11
2	5,350	1.37E-11	2.00E-09	1.31E-08	4.04E-08
3	3,947	1.10E-12	1.24E-10	1.21E-09	3.98E-09
4	3,850	9.40E-13	1.09E-10	9.64E-10	3.43E-09
5	7,500	3.53E-10	4.49E-08	2.74E-07	8.25E-07
6	12,300	2.85E-11	4.11E-09	2.61E-08	7.14E-08
7	17,683	7.46E-09	9.50E-07	6.73E-06	2.80E-05
8	6,356	6.79E-11	9.33E-09	6.01E-08	1.77E-07
9	8,540	1.36E-09	1.68E-07	1.01E-06	3.05E-06
10	7,640	4.29E-10	5.19E-08	3.21E-07	9.91E-07
Total Hazard			1.23E-06	8.45E-06	3.31E-05



Summary



- Inspection schedule optimization finds “the best” inspection schedule to manage the risk and minimize the cost.
- The hazard rate computed from a PDTA combined with the fleet demographics (fleet size, individual aircraft time in service, etc.) can be used to determine the probability of an event occurring within a fleet in a given flight time interval.
- Hazard rate and fleet demographics help to assess, manage, and mitigate the fleet safety risk.

Acknowledgements



- Advances in Probabilistic Damage Tolerance Analysis using the Smart/DT Software, Cooperative Agreement 692M152140011
 - Sohrob Mattaghi (FAA Tech Center) – Program Manager
 - Michael Reyer (Kansas City Office) – Sponsor
 - Michael Gorelik – Chief Scientific and Technical Advisor for Fatigue and Damage Tolerance

Questions

